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THE GIFT OF MILNER BALL
Thomas L. Shaffer*
My friend and teacher Milner Ball speaks of the law as "systemic
injustice."1 I find that a bit harsh and tend instead toward a way of
looking at injustice that comes from the equally melancholy
reflections of Robert E. Rodes, Jr., also my friend-my colleague,
too-and also my teacher (in two senses, including the I-once-paid-
tuition sense). Bob Rodes has noticed injustice as much as Milner
has, but Bob, who tends to be an Erastian,2 would say it is not the
law that is the source of injustice; it is not even the "system"; it is
lawyers who are the source of injustice, especially so in our North
American, relatively peaceful, lawyer-driven commonwealth.3
"We American layers," Bob has said, "live on the flip side of other
people's misery and degradation .... The economic, social, political,
and cultural structures that . . . provide our graduates with
interesting and remunerative jobs are the same ones that imprison
our poor people in a world of hamburger flipping, teenage
pregnancy, drive-by shootings, and crack, and inveigle many of our
rich people into a world of gilded banality."4 Lawyers preside over
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Notre Dame.
1 Milner S. Ball, Law Natural: Its Family of Metaphors and Its Theology, 3 J.L. &
RELIGION 141, 141 (1985) [hereinafter Ball, Law Natural] ("I am troubled by American law's
systemic injustice-i.e., its capacity for victimization, its fallenness.") (citing comments of his
own on work of David Kairys and Leonard Levy). He wrote, in a tribute to William
Stringfellow: "The legal system is a fallen institution ... in its morbidity, its aggressions
against life, its power to destroy." Milner S. Ball, A Meditation on Vocation, in RADICAL
CHRISTIAN AND EXEMPLARY LAWYER 129, 130 (Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. ed., 1995).
2 Erastus was a sixteenth century Swiss physician who taught (this is Bob's
characterization) that "the institutional church [is] one of a variety of institutions through
which a Christian society conforms itself to the will of God.... [It places] the church on a par
with the other institutions of society" and then tends to view the state as also carrying out
the purposes of God. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., The Last Days of Erastianism-Forms in the
American Church-State Nexus, 62 HARV. THEOLOGICALREV. 301,304 (1969); see also LAWAND
MODERNIZATION IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: CHARLES II TOTHE WELFARE STATE 2-14 (1991)
(discussing triumph of Erastianism).
3 See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in Religiously
Affiliated American Law Schools, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1859 (1993) (locating lawyers generally as
source of injustice).
4 Letter from Robert E. Rodes, Jr. to author (Sept. 15, 2006). Elsewhere, Bob and I have
described the preferential option for the poor:
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those structures; lawyers invented most of them. And lawyers could
do something about those structures, but they do not.
Not that either of these two teachers of mine differ in their
emphasis on social justice or on social justice's roots in the Gospel.
Milner, as he has focused on the system, has written, "The tradition
from which I speak is a theology and politics of the poor. It has to
do with their liberation."5 As this theology leads Milner to be an
admirer of the father of liberation theology, Gustavo Gutierrez,6 it
leads Bob to endorse the preferential option for the poor.7 It is clear,
though, from what Milner writes, that he finds precious little
redemption in the law.8 He is discontented with the law; his
discontent seems inevitable as he considers particulars in his
magnificent scholarship, in his classes on constitutional law, or in
the legal-aid clinic he sponsors at the University of Georgia. Bob
would agree with Milner's discontent, probably adding "no doubt,"
but then he would say that there is nothing inevitably unjust in the
What we must steadily ask of the world ... if we are to be truthful
teachers and scholars, is what effect legal transactions have on the people
underneath them. How does our real estate law affect people who need
places to live? How does our law on corporate mergers affect working
people and their families? How does our criminal justice system affect the
ability of the urban poor to walk out on their streets? How does the first
amendment affect their ability to teach their children to live decent lives?
The preferential option for the poor, understood in this way, is not an
ideology. It does not simply call us to replace our old institutions with
new ones. It calls us to examine carefully all institutions, new and old,
and take such control of them as is required to see that they serve the
whole society.
Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert E. Rodes, Jr., A Christian Theology for Roman Catholic Law
Schools, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 17 (1988); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Christian
Jurisprudence of Robert E. Rodes, Jr., 73 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 737,767-68 (1998) (discussing
Rodes's Christian-based theory on career choice as elements of his own jurisprudence).
' Ball, Law Natural, supra note 1, at 160 n.46.
6 See ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAW AND LIBERATION 214 (1986) ("It insists that those who
lack the minium conditions for a decent and contributing life must be provided with those
conditions regardless of the cost in social amenities for anyone else."); Shaffer & Rodes, supra
note 4, at 17 (calling legal scholars to examine effect of legal system on people, including the
poor); see also ROBERTE. RODES, JR., PILGRIMLAW 96-107 (1998) [hereinafter RODES, PILGRIM
LAW] (describing origins, theology, and doctrines of preferential option for the poor).
7 See RODES, PILGRAM LAw, supra note 6, at 96-107 (discussing liberation theology and
citing Gutierrez).
8 See, e.g., MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAw 160-64 (1993) (noting how evil law
has been for oppressed groups).
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system, nothing inevitable, either, about the discontent s The
problem for Bob is lawyers.
This difference between my two teachers may have something to
do with the fact that Milner, a student of Barth and Bonhoeffer and
Lehmann, is "inevitably" (here I use the world cautiously) a
Calvinist. And Bob is, as I am, a convert to Roman Catholicism and
a natural-law lawyer. (Bob and I are perhaps more nearly Marxists
than Milner is, but that point is a distraction here, and I will say no
more about it.) These are theological differences, if subtle ones, on
the subjects of systemic injustice and injustice in the (practice of)
law. Both are important and worth exploring.
But for now, at the beginning of this tribute to Milner, I would
rather explore theological harmonies. Maybe Milner would include
harmonies in the aspiration he adopts for himself from Karl Barth:
"The transformation of thought."' Perhaps transformation of
thought is what we three Christian lawyers are after-each of us.
And for each other, as we move among our students, who are
blessings for us, and as students move among poor people, who they
discover to be blessings for them. What I should want to do here is
to salute the theologies of these two teachers of mine, and in so
doing help my students (and maybe Milner's) as they represent real
people-mostly really poor people-in our legal aid clinics, and as
they face the issue these two teachers of mine seem to pose for
lawyers who are Christians: the issue of complicity with the
oppressors of the poor, (or, Milner might say, the system that
oppresses the poor), and what we and our students can do about it.
It can be put as a whose-side-are-you-on issue, as my friend Bob
put it in the quotation I invoked just above." But-and this is the
reason I want to compare my two teachers-it is an I-am-on-your-
side issue when seen the way Milner has seen it in his essays on the
law of the sea,'2 on Native Americans, 1" and on the law as
9 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10 Ball, Law Natural, supra note 1, at 141.
1 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12 Milner S. Ball, Law of the Sea: Expression of Solidarity, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 461
(1982).
i" Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1(1987).
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metaphor. 14 Bob would say, too, I think, that work in a legal-aid law
practice is an I-am-on-your-side situation. Here is what Bob is
writing, this year, in a manuscript he is working on, one of the many
pieces of his that has a Hoosier county-seat lawyer flavor:
Lawyers make their living by interfering in other
people's affairs. If they are to lead moral lives, they
must exercise moral discernment regarding those affairs
as well as regarding their own. ... People who come to
lawyers for advice are apt to be, to a greater or less
extent, traumatized. They are very apt, in the
unfamiliar situation they are encountering, to do
whatever their lawyers say. The lawyer, therefore, has
a serious responsibility not to tell them to do anything
wrong.
Not only must lawyers refrain from advising their
clients to do anything wrong; they must also refrain
from helping their clients do anything wrong that they
think up for themselves. Lawyers' moral discernment
must extend not only to their clients' agendas but also to
how far their service to their clients makes them
complicit in whatever wrong the clients do. 5
Bob writes with this paternalistic energy when he is directing his
comments to those of his students and graduates who seem to aspire
to positions of influence in corporate business. When he and I took
our road show to the new law school at the University of Dayton in
the late 1980s, he told law students there that it is not enough for
law teachers to encourage their students to work in legal-aid offices;
"the option for the poor," a principal doctrine of Father Gutierrez, "is
not a career choice." He said,
We are very right to give our graduates who go in for
legal services or public interest law at least as much
14 MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985).
'" Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Lawyers and Moral Discernment (2006) (unpublished
manuscript).
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positive reinforcement as we give the ones who make
partner on Wall Street, but to be content with that
would be . . . false consciousness. The burdens of
poverty are fashioned in the Wall Street offices faster
and more effectively than the legal services and public
interest offices can lift them. If you spend the day on
corporate takeovers and plant closings without thinking
about the people you put out of work, you cannot make
up for the harm you do by giving a woman free legal
advice in the evening when her unemployed husband
takes out his fr-ustrations by beating her.'"
Bob's approach to what we lawyers do, and to what our students
may, alas, want to do, has seemed right to me. I think Milner would
say it is right, even if it does sound a bit like sermonizing. This
approach raises interesting questions on the subject of moral
education in our clinical communities, in our law school
communities, and in the communities in which we live. It raises
questions that fit into Milner's insightful work on how the law-the
institution of the law, as he sees it, rather than lawyers-functions
to build a community or to put bulwarks around privilege.' 7 And
concern for community among lawyers and law teachers and for law
as medium raises questions about persuasive (rather than coercive)
uses of the law. Milner would get to all this on an occasion such as
this one. I will try to get to some of it.
16 See Shaffer & Rodes, supra note 4, at 17-18.
17 Milner's work is in significant part a meditation on Isaiah 11:6 (King James): "The
wolf also shall dwell with the lamb.., the calf and the young lion and the fatling together,"
which, to my friend Milner, suggests metaphors for the law of bulwark and medium:
The lion and the lamb will lie down all right, but is there to be no law
between them? Is law a function only of social pathology? Will we rise
above law? In Heaven there will be no law as bulwark. But what of law
as medium? Won't it be plentiful and, like the agreeable medium air,
utterly transparent?
Ball, Law Natural, supra note 1, at 156 n.35. Milner says,
The contrast I want to achieve is not that between the machine and the
garden or that between urbanization and pastoralism but between a
stifling, monolithic politics and a politics of hope and diversity. I intend
my elaboration of the Peaceable Kingdom to be one of Marx's "new
symbols of possibility."
Id. at 157 n.36 (quoting LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN 365 (1964)).
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Take, for a case, a situation that arose in our clinic, the Notre
Dame Legal Aid Clinic, which functions out of an old childcare
center in South Bend, Indiana, within a healthy walk from the more
verdant university campus. This case presents an ethical dilemma
that has energized American lawyers since at least 1820, and that
has stretched, in my recent observation, from a taped C.L.E.
program in the basement of our local courthouse to the European
Court of Human Rights (which divided on the issue 4-3). It is also
an issue that got the supervisors in our clinic called, by one of our
brothers at the bar downtown, "scurvy lawyers":
The case arose in the landlord-tenant context. Indiana landlord-
tenant law has protections for tenants who make security deposits
with their landlord. Our version of one of the protections is a
requirement that directs the landlord, when the tenancy is
concluded, either to return the tenant's security deposit or account
for the landlord's legitimate use of it. i" If the landlord fails to
account within forty-five days of the termination of the tenancy, the
tenant has a cause of action for the deposit and attorney's fees. 9
Case law adds to this remedy for failure to account a rule that bars
the landlord from recovering anything for damages the tenant has
done to the premises or for unpaid rent.2 ° A tenant who is evicted
for failure to pay rent (two months at, say, $500 a month) and leaves
behind damages that will cost $1,000 to repair, and who made a
security deposit of, say, $200, stands to gain $2,200 plus interest
and attorney's fees, if everything works out just right for him. He
gets all of that plus the satisfaction of having lived rent free for two
months. This situation is one of the rare provisions in property law
that actually favors the poor-but only when the lawyer for the poor
uses it right.
In this case-one of many in which our law office invoked the
security-deposit statute-the tenant (our client) failed to pay the
rent; the landlord threatened eviction; the tenant moved and gave
the landlord her new address. She paid the landlord nothing, and
18 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-31-3-12(a) (West 2002).
19 Id.
'o See, e.g., Hill v. Davis, 832 N.E.2d 544, 553-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
landlord's claims did not comply with statutory notice requirement and awarding tenants
their security deposit).
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the landlord sued in small-claims court, pro se, for damages and
unpaid rent. By the time the tenant came to us with the landlord's
summons in hand, the landlord had not accounted for the security
deposit. The clerk had set a hearing date on the landlord's lawsuit
forty days from the day the tenant moved. The tenant's coming to
us for representation turned out to be a good thing for her to do
because we knew enough to ask for a continuance on the hearing
date so that, when we all came to court, more than forty-five days
would have passed without a security-deposit accounting from the
day the tenant, our client, moved. On the day the forty-five days
ran (before the continued hearing), we filed a counterclaim for the
security deposit, interest, and attorney's fees. We won, of course,
and the landlord got nothing. The fees the court ordered the
landlord to pay to us went into our account for paying filing and
discovery expenses for other clients. And then, after all of this, the
landlord finally consulted a lawyer, who reviewed the file and told
us we were scurvy lawyers.2'
The case presented in the Continuing Legal Education program
in the basement of the courthouse was similar. The issue there was
a probate claim for medical expenses incurred by the decedent, the
mother of the presenter's client. The speaker's client's mother had
been dead for seven months; she knew her mother owed the hospital
five thousand dollars, but her mother left no money with which to
pay the hospital bill. She did not need a lawyer to tell her that, but,
then, something unexpected happened: She took from her late
mother's mailbox a two thousand dollar check from an insurance
company, made out to her late mother, consequent on the insurance
company's having "demutualized." The deceased's daughter, who
sought legal advice from the lawyer who made the C.L.E. tape,
wanted to know what to do with the check. The lawyer then
proceeded to apply for membership in the league of scurvy lawyers:
Indiana has a fast-track small-estate act under which the check
could have been turned into cash for the daughter with an affidavit
2 In another such case, where the tenant won a similar victory against a represented
landlord, the tenant's supervising attorney asked the student-lawyer, as they walked out of
court, whether the student thought they should file a complaint with the disciplinary
commission, reporting the other lawyer's poor representation ofhis landlord-client. That case
may prove, if nothing else, that the "ethical" snarl can be thrown both ways.
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from the daughter. But the presenting lawyer advised his new
client, the daughter, to wait a couple of months. Why? Because the
non-claim period for probate claims-another special statute of
limitations-is nine months.22 Two months to go and then the
hospital's claim is barred, and meanwhile the hospital has no way
to know there are funds from which it might, by opening an estate,
collect on its debts. (Of course, it could have opened an estate
anyway, just to find out if the estate had any assets. If it had done
that, the administrator of the estate would have taken control of the
decedent's mailbox, and then come upon the demutualization check,
which the administrator could then have cashed and from the
proceeds paid the hospital.)
The C.L.E. program in the basement of the courthouse was on
videotape. After the presenter finished his explanation of this case,
a feminine voice could be heard on the tape, saying, "But that would
not be ethical!" (I have, in a naughty little fantasy, thought to
myself that the invisible person giving that advice to us was the
presenter's mother.)
The moral issue presented here, in both examples, is whether it
is scurvy to invoke a statute of limitations. Assuming it would be at
least arguably scurvy for a lawyer to routinely invoke limitations in
cases such as these, there remains a narrower complicity issue, I
suppose, for us lawyers who do not function on what my teacher
Rodes calls the flip-side of poverty: whether it is all right for
lawyers in legal-aid clinics to do this sort of thing, but not all right
for lawyers representing liability insurance companies to do it. (The
last time I regularly invoked limitations was when I represented
insurance companies, and no one said a thing about it being
unethical for me to do it then.)
There are two issues here. Consider, first, a general disapproval
of lawyers who invoke limitations, regardless of the wealth of their
clients. This first issue is an old one-whether the lawyer's
invoking limitations is complicit in his client's wrongdoing (i.e., not
paying a bill he owes). David Hoffman (1784-1854), the grandfather
22 IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(d) (West 2002). But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (11th
ed. West) (amended 1989) (describing parallel time period as one year).
910 [Vol. 41:903
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of American legal ethics, saw it as complicity. "I will never plead
the statute of limitations, when based on the mere efflux of time,"
he said, "for if my client is conscious he owes the debt, and has no
other defense than the legal bar, he shall never make me a partner
in his knavery."23
Such a moralistic attitude may or may not have changed since
Hoffman wrote that tirade against knavery among debtors in 1836.
It appears to have changed, at least as to more prosperous clients,
before the end of Hoffman's century, by the time lawyers for the
robber barons and Wall Street law firms came into prominence.24
If it has changed on Wall Street, one might expect that it has
changed-or that it should have changed-in the legal-aid offices in
Harlem. Somehow, though, the complicity issue lingers in places
like Harlem (as we scurvy legal-aid lawyers know), if not on Wall
Street.
Here is one more current example, one that may show that
American law has become callous. (Milner, who enjoys casting his
thoughts out across the sea, might agree; Bob might say the system
is still just fine, and that it is lawyers who have become callous.)
The European Court of Human Rights, in 2005, held (by a vote of
4-3) that application of the English statute of limitations on actions
to recover possession of real estate (what property lawyers call
"adverse possession") violates the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.25 The
members of the judicial majority in Strasbourg were not persuaded
by familiar moral arguments for limitations (e.g., that the
landowner-former landowner-sat on his rights, as the landlord
and the bank did in the examples with which I started this
discussion).26 Nor do they seem to have been moved by the trial
2 THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION
TOPICS 64 (1985) (quoting 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, at Resolution XII
(2d ed. 1836)).
24 See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 83-84 (5th ed. 1884)
("The party has a right to have his case decided upon the law and the evidence .... The
lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and
indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury.").
25 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, No. 44302/02, slip op. IT 75 to 76 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Nov. 15, 2005), http://euronanotrade.com/News/Human%20Rights.doc.
26 id.
2007]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
judge in England, who applied English law with misgivings, hoping
perhaps that the European court would eventually do what it
eventually did: "[It does seem draconian to the owners and windfall
for the squatter," the English trial judge said, "that, just because the
owner has taken no step to evict a squatter for 12 years, the owner
should lose [the] land to the squatter with no compensation
whatsoever."27. David Hoffman would have agreed with the trial
judge, as the judges in Strasbourg eventually did (4-3).2S So would
the lady whose voice was heard on the videotape in the basement of
our local courthouse. Milner, I suppose, might say that, for lawyers,
not squatters, nor tenants, nor heirs, if it is a moral question, it is
a question of good law and bad law. And Bob, I suppose, would say
it is a question of moral practice in law offices.
Turning the focus to the "systemic" question, then-and in
tribute to my friend Milner-let's see if we can borrow something
from his splendid little paper (which I heard given orally, some time
ago, at Washington and Lee University) on law as metaphor.29 The
question is whether it is more useful to think first that injustice is
a systemic problem for the law or to think injustice is a moral
problem for lawyers. (Of course, before we get through, it will be
both; this is a question of where to look first.)
Milner wrote, in Law Natural, that we speak and write in
metaphors in order to reveal reality, but that sometimes metaphors
conceal reality as much as they reveal it.3"
For example, it is said that, 'Labor is a resource.' This
is a metaphor. It hides the distinction between
meaningful and dehumanizing work. It conceals the
oppression and misery of the people we refer to as the
'work force.' If labor is a resource, then it can be
exploited as though it were a resource.31
27 Id. 915.
's See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Ball, Law Natural, supra note 1.
30 Id. at 143.
31 Id.
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The metaphorical hand trick Milner noticed there is like saying that
the purpose of statutes of limitation is to keep parties from losing
track of relevant evidence. In the C.L.E. case, I suppose, it would be
a way to hide the fact that from one point of view we would be
stiffing the hospital, and, from another, that the system we are
stiffing hides the fact that, if the client's mother had had health
insurance, or Medicare or Medicaid, the amount paid (and paid in
full) would not have been $5,000; it would have been more like
$1,000. Or, to push that a bit, given the right facts, the metaphor
of limitations might be used to hide the situation of poor people who
have no insurance and have to get their medical care in expensive
emergency rooms. (I think that was where Milner was going with
this-where we lawyers watching the C.L.E. tape might have gone
with it, if we had wanted to get into metaphors.)
Milner's alternative was to look at the law as a medium-"a
device for relating rather than dividing people, something
connective . . . the means for keeping a conversation going, the
facilitator of dialogue and argument."32 In the C.L.E. example,
suppose the hospital had received $1,000, not $5,000 (conceding the
fact that it has received nothing yet). Might, then, the client of the
lawyer who spoke on the C.L.E. tape have been willing to give some
of her $2,000 to the hospital? Or even half of it (less attorney's
fees)? That metaphor, if you think of the law as otherwise
systemically unjust, has promise. And it has promise if you think
of lawyers as trying not to make things worse. It would be an
instance of Milner Ball looking at the law not as a bulwark, but as
a method of moral persuasion (medium).3" This is something he
writes about with regard to the law of the sea and with regard to the
situation of Native Americans, and where, extending the metaphor
to the C.L.E. example, one might avoid, now and then, thinking of
land as a commodity.
Milner's work is, in this way, again and again, about uses of the
law to build communities. He does that with a theory of narrative 4
32 Id. at 144.
33 Compare id. at 144 (discussing medium as alternative), with id. at 156-57 (discussing
law as bulwark and medium).
' See generally Milner S. Ball, Just Stories, in 12 CARDOZO STUDIES IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 37 (2000) (discussing benefits of narrative and stories); Milner S. Ball, Stories
2007] 913
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and as he contemplates communities from a Biblical perspective.35
He has, using stories from lawyers as unlike one another as Robert
Cover, William Stringfellow, and Charles Hamilton Houston,36
taken the lid off metaphors for rights and uncovered ajurisprudence
of community:
If law is to be anything other than a bulwark, what
transforms the fear, self-protectiveness, and love of
power that the bulwark serves?
. .. [An alternate conceptual metaphor for law not
only belongs with a particular family but also depends
upon its family connections for its vitality and fullness
of expression. Without that family, law as medium can
undergo a metamorphosis into its opposite. Within the
family, its integrity is maintained. Law is a medium of
solidarity where there is a community needing a
medium for its mutuality ... where . .. politics is an
activity of a body with diverse members . . . and
authentic humanity is being for others ... a medium in
and for a Peaceable Kingdom.3 v
CONCLUSION
At the end of Alice McDermott's new novel After This, a bride
with child, her groom, both families, and Monsignor McShane, the
old Irish pastor of St. Gabriel's, are gathered for a discreet wedding
that will anticipate the birth by a couple of months. 8 The music is
to be on the piano, not the organ, and is to be played by the bride's
Presbyterian neighbor, who has come to St. Gabriel's early, to
of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280 (1989) (analyzing stories of
origin in constitutional context).
35 See, e.g., BALL, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that he takes his theology seriously); BALL,
supra note 14, at 19 (discussing story of America's constitutional origin); Ball, Law Natural,
supra note 1, at 161 (describing law focused on Christ's coming); BALL, supra note 8 (quoting
Calvin and noting that wisdom of knowledge requires contemplation of divine).
36 See generally Milner S. Ball, Onward Constitutional Soldiers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1438
(1989) (reviewing SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988)).
"7 See Ball, Law Natural, supra note 1, at 161-62.
8 ALICE MCDERMOTr, AFTER THIS 273-79 (2006).
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acquaint himself with its strange Catholic piano.39 The neighbor
plays beautifully; the monsignor is moved by the music: "sacred,
profound, barely apprehensible, inscrutable really, something just
beyond the shell of earth and sky.., that needed only this boy to
bring it, briefly, briefly, to his untrained ear."
40
The pastor asks the boy, as they walk up the aisle of the empty
church to meet the wedding party, whether his skill is the product
of"a lot of lessons."4' The boy answers, "[I]t seems like I've always
known how to play."4 2 Ms. McDermott and the monsignor invite us
readers in the last line of the novel to think of that answer and of
the piano player, the baby, the bride and groom, the families, and
the neighbors, as the monsignor says, "It's a gift, then."43 The gift
might be, as my friend Milner, himself a gift, would say, community.
If so, it is a gift as my friend Bob would say, resting on a virtue.
Mary Keane, the mother of the bride and grandmother of the
baby that is soon to join the family, noticed something like this the
day the bride was born-seventeen years before the wedding. As
Mary Keane remembered the kindness of another neighbor who had
come to help with the birth of the baby who was to become the bride,
she thought, as she heard the neighbor say "hello" at the door, of
what Milner would (I think) say community is:
It was simply what you did; you made conversation in
elevators, complimented small children in strollers,
looked up from your magazine to greet the stranger who
took the seat beside you on a bus. You said, with simple
friendliness, That's a lovely hat, or Isn't it
cold?-because it was another way of saying here we are,
all of us, more or less in the same boat. It was the habit
of friendliness, a lifetime of it.'
3 Id. at 276.
40 Id. at 278.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 279.
4 Id. at 62.
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Aristotle, my friend Rodes, and I would agree with Mary Keane
about the virtue of friendliness, the lifetime of it. My friend Ball,
himself often a pastor, would agree with the monsignor: "It's a
gift."45 And Piglet, friend of Winnie the Pooh, would say, "Same
thing."
45 Id. at 279.
916 [Vol. 41:903
